|
New Delhi & the Tamil Struggle
Tamil Eelam has to be the final solution
V.Gopalasamy, MDMK
14 May 2000
When Sri Lanka boasts of getting arms from 30 countries,
it is only natural for the people of Tamil Nadu to think of requesting
the Central government for providing assistance to the Tamils fighting
in the island.
But we haven’t made any such request because it would have
embarrassed the government. Obviously, India can’t be blamed
for helping the Tamil movement and dividing the island.
India should not jeopardise the unity, integrity and sovereignty
of the island. But if Sri Lanka can’t preserve its unity,
and the Tamils there achieve their goal of Eelam, then only history
can stand in judgement on the events of today. But we should not
at any cost help the Sri Lankan government. For, this will cause
resentment and anger among the Tamil youth in Tamil Nadu —
and militate against India’s unity and integrity.
Some overzealous people try to create a fear psychosis about Tamil
Eelam. As a student of history, I’m sure Tamil Eelam will
be realised one day. Unless you go deep into the Tamil ethnic problem,
it’s not possible to understand the factors that contributed
to the demand of Eelam.
The island of Ceylon consists of two nations — the Tamil
and the Sinhala. They inhabit two separate contiguous areas and
had their own kingdoms until the advent of the Europeans. In 1833,
the island came under British rule. When the island became independent
in 1948, the power was handed over to the Sinhalas. The Tamils then
were confident that they would be treated with dignity.
But what actually followed was discrimination against the Tamils
in every sphere of activity. When they sought justice through democratic
means, a brutal reign of terror was let loose on them. In 1956,
Sinhalese was declared the only official language, and subsequently
Buddhism became the state religion.
In 1957, the Eelam Gandhi, Chelvanayakam, had a pact with Bandaranaike
to meet some of the aspirations of the Tamils. But the Buddhist
clergy opposed the pact. J.R. Jayawardane went on a padayatra opposing
this agreement — and the Sinhalas unilaterally abrogated it.
In ’65 Chelvanayakam entered into an agreement with then Prime
Minister Senanayake.
In 1974, government security forces entered the venue of the World
Tamil Conference and opened fire killing nine. Rape was used as
a tool to terrorise the population; killings, plunder and arrest
without trial were the order of the day. In 1981, the Great Jaffna
Library and its 100,000 precious books were burnt to ashes, demonstrating
that the Sinhalas wanted to destroy the last vestiges of Tamil cultural
identity. The 1983 progrom against the Tamils began with the butchering
of 64 Tamils in the Wellikadai prison.
Meanwhile, it’s a painful irony that the original inhabitants
of the North and East were contemptuous of those who had gone from
South India to the island as plantation labour. The government served
a mortal blow to this second category of Tamils of Indian origin
by disenfrachising them after Independence. It’s indeed a
black mark on Nehru’s image that India under him didn’t
utter a word against this violation of human rights.
On May 14, 1976, under the chairmanship of Chelvanayakam, the Tamils
unanimously resolved at Vaddukottai that co-existence with the Sinhalas
was impossible. They decided on a separate state of Eelam —
and for a life of dignity and honour.
The armed struggle began a year earlier in 1975. The Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was founded on May 5, 1975. Indira
Gandhi helped set up training camps in India. By 1983 the LTTE emerged
stronger. When Indira Gandhi was assassinated, there was a black
flag in every Tamil home in the North and East. In fact, Sinhala
forces opened fire that day asking the Tamils: “Will your
amma come and save you now?”
In 1986-87 the victorious LTTE overran the Nelliadi Sinhala Army
camp killing 900 soldiers. On August 16, 1987, the Swedish Broadcasting
Corporation exploded Bofors. Rajiv Gandhi wanted to divert the people’s
attention. Jayawardane was pushing for a peace accord. Gandhi was
happy to exploit the situation.
The first secretary in the Indian High Commission in Sri Lanka
invited Prabhakaran to India. Prabhakaran refused, but he was assured
that India wanted to recognise the LTTE as the sole representative
of the Tamils and extend all help. Prabhakaran came to Delhi with
Anton Balasingham on July 24-25, 1987. The moment he reached Delhi,
he was shown the proposed accord between India and Sri Lanka. Prabhakaran
was shocked. He didn’t accept it. Nobody was allowed to meet
him. It was as if he was under house arrest. Prabhakaran was pressured
to accept the proposal. Meanwhile, Rajiv flew to Colombo and signed
the accord with Jayawardane.
Prabhakaran returned to Jaffna on August 1. On August 4, he declared
at a public meeting that the mighty Indian State had thrust the
accord down the Tamils’ throat. He symbolically laid down
his arms proclaiming that the security of the Tamils was now India’s
responsibility.
The accord was a disappointment. First, it should have been between
the Tamils and the Sinhalas, but it turned out to be one between
the oppressor and the mediator. The issue of State-aided colonisation
of the Tamil land, among other things, was not answered. LTTE leader
Dileepan died 12 days after he began his protest fast.
A series of betrayals followed. On October 3, 1987, 17 LTTE commanders
were arrested by the Sri Lankan Navy. The Indian Army threw a protective
cordon around them, but then Delhi asked that the leaders be handed
over to the Lankan forces. And this while Prabhakaran pleaded with
Delhi, even wrote eight letters to the government here. But it was
to no avail — and the 17 LTTE commanders committed suicide.
Subsequently, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) sent former
Jaffna commander Johnny to meet Prabhakaran in the jungles. When
he came back the IPKF shot him down. The IPKF was assigned a mercenary’s
job. Indian soldiers died because of the wrong policy of their government.
The killing of Rajiv Gandhi was a dastardly act. The assassination
swept under the carpet all outstanding issues. Many of our leaders
are not even fully aware as to why the talks between the LTTE and
the Sri Lankan government broke down in 1994. The Chandrika Kumaratunge
government was procuring arms even as it was involved in the parley.
No wonder, the LTTE walked out.
In 1995, when the Sinhala Army entered Jaffna, 168 men, women and
children were killed at Navali’s St. Peter’s church.
Even Pope John Paul expressed his deep sorrow and concern for the
Tamils. Then UN secretary general Boutros Boutros Ghali appealed
to the international community to provide solace and succour to
the suffering Tamils of Jaffna. But India didn’t utter a word
of consolation, nor was there any assistance.
Now, after the fall of Elephant Pass, the Sri Lankan Army is seeking
our assistance. But the statesmanship of Vajpayee has ensured that
India will not repeat the earlier mistakes and take the correct
decision of not interfering in the island’s affairs. If both
the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government approach us, then India could
consider playing a role. In that case the ban on LTTE should be
removed so that India’s future efforts are more meaningful.
But then, remember, Eelam is the final solution. |